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This paper asks whether inflation targeting improves economic performance, as measured by the
behavior of inflation, output, and interest rates. We compare seven OECD countries that adopted
inflation targeting in the early 1990s to thirteen that did not. After the early 90s, performance improved
along many dimensions for both the targeting countries and the non-targeters. In some cases the
targeters improved by more; for example, average inflation fell by a larger amount. However, these
differences are explained by the facts that targeters performed worse than non-targeters before the early
90s, and there is regression to the mean. Once one controls for regression to the mean, there is no
evidence that inflation targeting improves performance.
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“The performance of inflation-targeting regimes has been quite
good.  Inflation-targeting countries seem to have significantly
reduced both the rate of inflation and inflation expectations
beyond that which would likely have occurred in the absence of
inflation targets.”  (Mishkin, 1999, p. 595)
[The U.K. data show] “that not only has inflation been lower
since inflation targeting was introduced, but that, as measured
by its standard deviation, it has also been more stable than in
recent decades.  Moreover, inflation has been less persistent –
in the sense that shocks to inflation die away more quickly –
under inflation targeting than for most of the past century.”
(King, 2002, p. 2).
“[O]ne of the main benefits of inflation targets is that they may
help to “lock in” earlier disinflationary gains, particularly in
the face of one-time inflationary shocks.  We saw this effect,
for example, following the exits of the United Kingdom and Sweden
from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism and after Canada’s 1991
imposition of the Goods and Services Tax.  In each case, the re-
igniting of inflation seems to have been avoided by the
announcement of inflation targets that helped to anchor the
public’s inflation expectations and to give an explicit plan for
and direction to monetary policy.” (Bernanke et al., 1999, p.
288).
I. INTRODUCTION
     Economists have long sought the ideal framework for monetary
policy.  Since the early 1990s, many have come to believe they
have finally found the right approach: inflation targeting.
Proponents of this policy cite many benefits.  Inflation
targeting solves the dynamic consistency problem that produces
high average inflation.  It reduces inflation variability, and if
“flexible” it can stabilize output as well (Svensson, 1997). 
Targeting locks in expectations of low inflation, which reduces2
the inflationary impact of macroeconomic shocks.  For these
reasons, many economists advocate inflation targeting for the
Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank.
     This paper attempts to measure the effects of inflation
targeting on macroeconomic performance.  We examine twenty OECD
countries, seven that adopted inflation targeting during the
1990s and thirteen that did not.  Not surprisingly, economic
performance varies greatly across individual countries, both
targeters and non-targeters.  But on average, there is no
evidence that inflation targeting improves performance as
measured by the behavior of inflation, output, or interest rates.
     If we examine inflation-targeting countries alone, we see
that their performance improved on average between the period
before targeting and the targeting period.  For example,
inflation fell and became more stable, and output growth also
stabilized.  However, countries that did not adopt inflation
targeting also experienced improvements around the same times as
targeters.  This finding suggests that better performance
resulted from something other than targeting.
     For some performance measures, both inflation targeters and
non-targeters improve over time, but the improvements are larger
for targeters.  For example, average inflation fell for both
groups between the pre-targeting and targeting periods, but the3
average for targeters went from above that of non-targeters to
roughly the same.  Similar findings have led authors such as
Neumann and von Hagen (2002) to argue that inflation targeting
promotes “convergence”: it helps poorly-performing countries
catch up with countries that are already doing well.  Our
results, however, do not support even this modest claim of
benefits from targeting.  For many measures of performance, we
find strong evidence of generic regression to the mean.  Just as
short people on average have children who are taller than they
are, countries with unusually high and unstable inflation tend to
see these problems diminish, regardless of whether they adopt
inflation targeting.  Once we control for this effect, the
apparent benefits of targeting disappear.
     The rest of this paper comprises eight sections.  Section 2
describes the countries and sample periods that we study, and 
Section 3 describes our methodology for measuring the effects of
inflation targeting.
     Sections 4 and 5 present our results concerning inflation
and output growth.  We estimate the effects of inflation
targeting on these variables’ average levels, variability, and
persistence.  There are occasional hints that targeting has
beneficial effects and occasional hints of adverse effects, but
overall it appears that targeting does not matter.4
     Section 6 turns to the behavior of interest rates, and
presents two main findings.  First, inflation targeting has no
effect on the level of long-term interest rates, contrary to what
one would expect if targeting reduces inflation expectations. 
Second, targeting does not affect the variability of the short-
term interest rates controlled by policymakers.  At least by this
crude measure, central banks respond neither more nor less
aggressively to economic fluctuations under inflation targeting. 
     Section 7 investigates the effects of targeting on several
bivariate relations: the slope of the output-inflation tradeoff,
the inflationary effect of supply shocks (specifically changes in
commodity prices), and the effect of inflation movements on
expectations (as measured by OECD inflation forecasts).  Here the
results are imprecise, as it is difficult to estimate these
relations over the short periods for which we have observed
inflation targeting.  However, the results suggest again that
targeting has no important effects.
     Section 8 compares our results to previous cross-country
studies of inflation targeting.  Finally, Section 9 interprets
our results.  To be clear, we do not present a case against
inflation targeting.  We do not find that targeting does anything
harmful, and we can imagine future circumstances in which it
might be beneficial.  Our results suggest, however, that 5
no major benefits have occurred so far.
II. THE SAMPLE
     This section describes the countries in our sample and the
inflation-targeting and non-targeting periods that we examine.  
     A. Targeters and Non-Targeters
     We examine major developed, moderate-inflation economies. 
Specifically, we start with all members of the OECD as of 1990
(thus excluding the emerging-market economies that have joined
since then).  We delete countries that lacked an independent
currency before the Euro (Luxembourg) or have experienced annual
inflation over 20% since 1984 (Greece, Iceland, and Turkey).  We
are left with twenty countries, which are listed in Table I. 
Previous macroeconomic studies using the same sample of countries
include Layard et al. (1991) and Ball (1997).
     Seven of the countries in our sample adopted inflation
targeting before 1999: Australia, Canada, Finland, Spain, Sweden,
U.K., and New Zealand.  For each country, we define the beginning
of targeting as the first full quarter in which a specific
inflation target or target range was in effect, and the target
had been announced publicly at some earlier time.  This
definition of targeting is more stringent than that of previous
authors, such as Bernanke et al. (1999) and Scheater et al.6
(2000).  These authors often date the start of targeting at the
point when targets were first announced, even if they were
implemented with a delay.  In other cases, targeting is said to
begin when the central bank retrospectively said it did, even
though it was not announced at the time.  Our view is that many
of the intended effects of targeting, such as those working
through expectations, depend on agents knowing that they are
currently in a targeting regime.  
     As an example of our dating, consider Sweden.  Sweden
announced its shift to inflation targeting during 1993, so 
Bernanke et al. and Scheater et al. date the regime from then. 
However, the first announced target was 2 percent for inflation
over the twelve months to December 1995.  We choose the first
quarter of this period, 1995:1, as the beginning of the targeting
regime.  Table I gives the starting dates of targeting for the
other countries along with brief explanations for our choices. 
The starting dates range from 1990:3 for New Zealand to 1995:2
for Spain.
     The targeting period lasts through 2001 for all countries
except Finland and Spain, where it lasts through 1998 because of
the advent of the Euro.  For each country, we compare the
targeting period to two pre-targeting periods, a longer one that
begins in 1960 and a shorter one that begins in 1985.  The last7
quarter of the pre-targeting period is the last full quarter
before targeting began (either the quarter before the start of
the targeting period or two quarters before, depending on whether
targeting began at the start of a quarter or in the middle).
     Throughout, we compare the seven inflation targeters to the
other thirteen countries in the sample.  Two of these countries
have adopted inflation targeting recently: Switzerland in 1999
and Norway in 2000.  We exclude these countries’ brief targeting
periods from our sample and treat Switzerland and Norway as non-
targeters.  Following our approach for targeters, we compare pre-
targeting periods starting in 1960 and 1985 to post-targeting
periods.  For the non-targeters, we define the post-targeting
period as starting at the mean of the start dates for targeters,
which is 1993:3.  The post-targeting period ends in 1998 for Euro
countries and 2001 for non-Euro countries besides Norway and
Switzerland.  Table II gives details of our dating.
     Of the thirteen non-targeting countries, eight joined the
Euro in 1999.  Previously, these countries were part of the
European Monetary System, so their monetary policies focused on
fixing exchange rates and meeting convergence criteria.  Two of
the non-targeters, Germany and Switzerland (one also in the EMS),
followed policies based on money-supply targets.  The remaining
four countries did not follow any announced rule – they pursued 1 In addition, we tried adding a Euro dummy to all of our cross-country 
regressions.  This variable is usually insignificant.  The only exception is
that Euro countries experienced larger falls in the standard deviation of
output growth between the pre- and post-targeting periods.  Including the Euro
dummy never changes our findings about the effects of inflation targeting. 
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the policy of “just do it” (Mishkin, 1999).  In the results we
report, we lump all non-targeting countries together and compare
them to targeters.  We have checked, however, whether there are
systematic differences in performance among the non-targeting
groups, and fail to find any.  We have also performed our
comparisons of targeters and non-targeters excluding all Euro
countries (which leaves five targeters and five non-targeters). 
This produces no noteworthy changes in results.
1 
     B. Constant Targeting
     In addition to studying inflation-targeting periods, we
examine periods in which countries are constant inflation
targeters, meaning they have an unchanging target or target
range.  In some countries the target is always constant, but in
others the constant-targeting period is preceded by a
transitional period in which the target exceeds its final level. 
We examine constant-targeting periods because some benefits of
targeting might not arise if the target changes.  For example,
proponents of targeting argue that it reduces the persistence of2 For New Zealand, we date the constant-targeting period from 1993:1 to
the end of the sample even though the target range was widened from 0-2% to 0-
3% in 1997.  The half-point change in the midpoint was smaller (and of the
opposite sign) than the target changes during transitional periods in other
countries.  In our judgement the 1997 episode was not a substantial change in
policy.   
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inflation movements, but a changing target causes permanent
changes in inflation.2
     Throughout this paper, we compare inflation targeters (IT)
to non-targeters (NIT), and constant-inflation targeters (CIT) to
non-constant-targeters (NCIT).  Spain is an inflation targeter,
but its target fell throughout its targeting period; when we
split countries into CIT and NCIT, we put Spain in the second
group.  For both CIT and NCIT countries, we examine periods
before and after the start of constant targeting.  The start date
of the post-targeting period for NCIT countries is the average
start date for constant targeting in CIT countries.  
    Table II lists sample periods for each of the twenty
countries.  We call the two pre-inflation-targeting periods,
those starting in 1960 and 1985, samples 1 and 2 respectively. 
Sample 3 is the post-targeting period.  Samples 4 and 5 are pre-
constant-targeting periods, and sample 6 is the post-constant-
targeting period.  While the distinction between IT and CIT is
important in principle, our findings about economic performance10
in the pre- and post-targeting periods are similar in the two
cases.
III. METHODOLOGY
     We want to determine how inflation targeting (or constant
targeting) affects dimensions of economic performance such as
inflation, output growth, and interest rates.  We examine each
aspect of performance in turn, using a consistent methodology to
measure the effects of targeting.  Here we describe the
methodology.
     Suppose we are interested in how targeting affects a
variable X -– for example, X might be the average level of
inflation or the variance of output growth.  We first calculate 
X for each of our 20 countries in each of our six sample periods. 
Then, for each period, we calculate the average value of X for
inflation targeters and non-targeters (or, for samples 4 through
6, constant targeters and non-constant targeters).  These
averages show whether X differs systematically across periods or
across targeters and non-targeters.
     As we have mentioned, many measures of economic performance
improved on average between the pre-inflation-targeting and post-
targeting periods.  In most major economies, the period since the
early 1990s has seen low and stable inflation and stable output11
growth.  If we examine inflation targeting countries alone, there
are clear economic improvements that one might be tempted to
attribute to targeting.  However, to learn the true effects of
targeting, we must compare improvements in targeting countries to
improvements in non-targeting countries.
     As a first pass at this comparison, we use a standard
“differences in differences” approach.  For our sample of twenty
countries, we run the regression
   (1)           Xpost – Xpre  =  ao + a1D + e ,
where Xpost is a country’s value of X in the post-targeting
period, Xpre is the value in the pre-targeting period, and D is a
dummy variable equal to one if the country is a targeter.  We run
several versions of this regression corresponding to different
start dates for the pre-targeting period (1960 or 1985) and
whether targeting means IT or CIT.  The coefficient a1 is meant
to measure the effect of targeting on the variable X.
     This regression can be misleading, however.  For some
versions of the variable X, the initial value, Xpre, is
substantially different on average for inflation targeters and
non-targeters.  For example, average inflation in the pre-
targeting period is higher for targeters.  This fact is not
surprising: a switch to targeting was most attractive to
countries with poor performances under their previous policies. 3 Baseball statistics exhibit substantial regression to the mean.  This fact
explains the well-known “sophomore slump”: the tendency of players with strong
rookie years to do less well during their second years (e.g. Gilovich, 1984).
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However, a problem arises because of regression to the mean. 
Poor performers in the pre-targeting period tend to improve more
than good performers simply because initial performance depends
partly on transitory factors.  If inflation targeters are poor
initial performers, they will improve more than non-targeters,
even if targeting does not affect performance.  The coefficient
on the targeting dummy can be significant, producing a spurious
conclusion that targeting matters.
     As an analogy, consider the behavior of Major League batting
averages.  Suppose a crackpot sports consultant suggests that a
hitter will perform better if he sleeps next to his bat at night. 
In reality, this idea does not work.  Most .300 hitters merely
chuckle at the consultant, but .220 hitters are desperate enough
to try anything, and start taking their bats to bed.  Because of
regression to the mean, the low-average hitters who sleep with
their bats will tend to improve more than the high-average
hitters who leave their bats in their lockers.  If the sports
consultant regresses the change in a player’s average on a bat-
in-bed dummy, he will find a significant effect.  He will claim
incorrectly that the evidence supports his theory.
3  13
     For readers who prefer math to baseball, the Appendix to
this paper formalizes our argument.  We assume that the variable
X depends on a country effect, a period effect, a country-period
effect, and possibly an inflation-targeting dummy.  The presence
of the country-period effect generates regression to the mean. 
If Xpre is correlated with the targeting dummy, as happens in
practice, then regression (1) produces a biased estimate of the
dummy coefficient.
     Fortunately, there is a simple way to eliminate this bias:
add the initial value of X to the differences regression.  That
is, we run
   (2)     Xpost – Xpre  =  ao + a1D + a2Xpre + e .
Including Xpre controls for regression to the mean.  The
coefficient on the dummy now shows whether targeting affects a
country’s change in performance for a given initial performance. 
If a1 is significant, then a targeter with poor initial
performance improves more than a non-targeter with equally poor
initial performance.  This difference implies a true effect of
targeting.
     Once again, the Appendix formalizes our argument.  Under the
assumptions we make there, regression (2) produces an unbiased
estimate of the dummy coefficient.14
IV . INFLATION
     In a recent speech, the next Governor of the Bank of England
posed the question “Ten Years of the Inflation Target: what has
it achieved?”  As quoted at the start of this paper, he suggests
that targeting has reduced the average level, variability, and
persistence of U.K. inflation.  In contrast, we find little
evidence in cross-country data that targeting has any of these
effects.
     A. Average Inflation
     Table III presents our results concerning the average level
of inflation.  Inflation is measured by the annualized percentage
change in consumer prices from the IMF’s International Financial
Statistics.  In Panel A of the table, we show average inflation
in each of our twenty countries and six sample periods.  For each
period, we also show the averages across targeting and non-
targeting countries.  Panel B reports our estimates of equations
(1) and (2) above.
     Not surprisingly, there is considerable cross-country
variation in average inflation.  In sample 2, for example (1985
to start of inflation targeting), average inflation ranges from
double digits in New Zealand and Portugal to less than two
percent in Japan and Netherlands.  In almost every country,
average inflation is lower in the targeting periods (samples 315
and 6) than in the pre-targeting periods.  The cross-country
variation is smaller in the targeting periods, as all inflation
rates are under four percent.
     Turning to cross-country averages, we see that the IT group
had higher inflation than the NIT group before targeting was
introduced.  (Here and elsewhere, the comparison between the CIT
and NCIT groups is similar.)  For the shorter pre-targeting
sample, average inflation is 5.8% for IT countries and 3.7% for
NIT.  In the targeting period, by contrast, average inflation is
close to 1.9% for both groups.  On average, targeters converged
to the lower inflation levels of non-targeters.  
     This convergence result is echoed in the first part of Panel
B, where we regress the change in average inflation on the
targeting dummy.  For the shorter pre-targeting sample, the
coefficient on the dummy is -2.2: average inflation fell by 2.2
points more in targeters than in non-targeters.  This coefficient
is the same as the difference in differences of means between
samples 2 and 3.  The regression reveals that this inflation-
targeting effect is statistically significant (t=2.5).
     Inflation targeting is important if it really reduces
average inflation by more than two percentage points.  However,
most of this apparent effect is illusory: it reflects the facts
that targeters had high initial inflation, and there is16
regression to the mean.  Panel B shows that regression to the
mean is strong: when initial inflation is included in the
inflation-change equation, its coefficient is -0.78.  Controlling
for this effect, the estimated effect of targeting is only -0.55,
and its statistical significance is weak (t=1.57, p-value=0.14). 
Looking ahead, however, we will see that this result is one of
our more positive findings about inflation targeting!
     Note how much of the variation in inflation changes is
explained by initial inflation: including this variable raises
the R
2's from 0.2 or below to 0.9.  Figure 1 illustrates this
point by plotting the change in inflation from sample 2 to sample
3 against the level in sample 2.  The Figure shows a tight
relationship, confirming the strong role of regression to the
mean.  The targeting countries tend to have high initial
inflation and large decreases, but the decrease for a given
initial level looks similar for targeters and non-targeters.
     B. Inflation Variability
     Tables IV and V examine the variability of inflation, using
the same format as the average-inflation table.  Table IV
presents standard deviations of quarterly inflation, and Table V
presents standard deviations of “trend inflation,” defined as a
nine-quarter moving average.  We examine trend inflation because 4 In analyzing trend inflation, we include a quarter in a sample only if
all quarters that contribute to the nine-quarter average are in the sample. 
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targeters might stabilize this variable even if they cannot
smooth out higher-frequency inflation shocks.4
     There is no evidence whatsoever that inflation targeting
reduces inflation variability.  The standard deviations of
inflation and trend inflation fall for all groups of countries
during the targeting period.  At all times, the standard
deviations are lower for non-targeters than for targeters.
Equation 1 suggests that targeters experience larger falls in
standard deviations, but this result disappears when equation 2
controls for regression to the mean.
       In fact, Table IV suggests that, controlling for
regression to the mean, inflation targeting raises the standard
deviation of inflation.  This effect is sometimes statistically
significant.  Nonetheless, this perverse result is likely a fluke
(given the number of regressions we run, our tests should produce
some Type I errors).  Our robust finding is that inflation
targeting has no beneficial effects.
     C. Inflation Persistence
     Finally, we examine the persistence of inflation movements. 
For each country and sample period, we estimate an AR-4 model for
quarterly inflation.  Then, for each period, we average each AR5  Note that the impulse responses for targeters in samples 3 and 6 are
negative at some lags.  We have checked the statistical significance of the
negative responses with Monte Carlo experiments, following Sheridan (2001). 
The only response that is significantly negative is the response for CIT
countries in period t+4.  We are inclined to dismiss the negative responses as
a fluke, because they are not plausible theoretically.  
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coefficient across targeting and non-targeting countries.  Using
these average coefficients, we compute impulse response functions
showing the effects of inflation shocks on future inflation.
     Figure 2 presents some of our results.  We use solid lines
for the impulse responses functions in targeting countries and
dashed lines for non-targeters.  For each group, we present
results for the long pre-targeting periods (samples 1 and 4) and
the targeting periods (samples 3 and 6).  We omit responses for
the short pre-targeting samples, which always lie between the
responses that we show. 
     The Figure shows that inflation persistence has decreased
over time – inflation has become more “anchored.”  In the pre-
targeting periods, a unit inflation shock in quarter t raises
inflation at t+1 by more than 0.4 points, and this effect dies
out slowly.  For the targeting period, the effect is around 0.2
at t+1, and it disappears in a few quarters.  Crucially, this
pattern holds for both targeting and non-targeting countries. 




     We now ask whether inflation targeting affects output
behavior.  We examine the mean and standard deviation of real
output growth, using the same methods we applied to inflation
behavior.  We use annual output data, as reliable quarterly data
are not available for all countries in our sample.  For each
country, we include a year in a given sample period only if all
four quarters of the year belong to the sample under our
quarterly dating.
     A. Average Growth
     There is no obvious theoretical reason that inflation
targeting should affect average output growth.  (It might if it
affected inflation behavior and inflation affects growth, but see
our negative findings about inflation.)  Nonetheless, Mishkin
(1999) suggests
“A conservative conclusion is that, once low inflation is
achieved, inflation targeting is not harmful to the real economy.
Given the strong economic growth after disinflation was achieved
in many countries that have adopted inflation targets, New
Zealand being one outstanding example, a case can be made that
inflation targeting promotes real economic growth in addition to
controlling inflation.” (p. 597)
Here we examine this idea, with inconclusive results.
     Table VI presents our results about average growth rates. 
Average growth increased in inflation targeting countries after
targeting began, and it decreased slightly in non-targeting20
countries.  When we control for regression to the mean, our point
estimates imply that targeting raises average growth by a
substantial amount: from 0.7 to 1.3 percentage points, depending
on the specification.  However, all the t-statistics are below
1.5, and three of four are below 1.2.  Thus the point estimates
do not mean much.
       Our estimates are imprecise because growth rates vary
greatly across individual countries.  In our short samples,
average growth depends on economies’ cyclical positions when the
samples start and end as well as growth in potential output.  We
need to observe inflation targeting over longer periods to see
whether it affects average growth.
     B. Output Variability
    Some economists argue that “flexible” inflation targeting
stabilizes output as well as inflation.  Others, such as
Cecchetti and Ehrmann (1999), suggest that targeting makes output
more variable.  Once again, we find that targeting simply does
not matter.
     Table VII presents results about the standard deviation of
annual output growth.  These results mostly echo our findings
about the standard deviation of inflation.  In the short pre-
targeting periods and the targeting periods, output is more
stable for non-targeting countries than for targeters.  For both21
groups, output becomes more stable during the targeting period. 
When we control for regression to the mean, our estimates suggest
that targeting raises output variability, but this effect is not
statistically significant. 
VI. INTEREST RATES
     We next examine the level of long-term interest rates, which
should reflect inflation expectations, and the variability of
short-term rates, which might indicate the activism of monetary
policy.
     A. Average Long-Term Rates
     We have seen that inflation targeters and non-targeters have
experienced similar reductions in inflation since the early
1990s.  Targeting proponents argue, however, that targeting locks
in low inflation permanently, while adverse events might reignite
inflation under “just do it” policies.  If the public believes
this argument, then targeting should reduce both expected
inflation and inflation uncertainty.  As discussed by King
(2002), both effects should reduce long-term interest rates.
     We look for this effect in OECD data on ten-year government
bond rates.  The data are annual, so we date our sample periods
by years, as in our work on output behavior.  The data start in
1970, so we begin samples 1 and 4 in that year rather than 1960.6  Neumann and von Hagen and Kuttner and Posen (1999) estimate Taylor rules for
inflation targeters.  For a critique, see Mishkin’s (2002) discussion of
Neumann and von Hagen.
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     Table VIII presents our results, which are highly
reminiscent of our inflation and output results.  If we define
better performance by lower interest rates, then non-targeters
always do better than targeters; both groups improved during the
targeting period; the improvement is somewhat larger for
targeters; but the effect of targeting disappears when we control
for regression to the mean.
     B. The Variability of Short-Term Interest Rates
     In addition to examining economic outcomes, we would like to
know whether inflation-targeting central banks move their policy
instruments differently from non-targeters.  In principle, one
can address this issue by estimating reaction functions for
short-term interest rates (i.e. Taylor rules).  In practice, it
appears difficult to get meaningful estimates of these equations
with the short samples at hand.  We therefore examine a cruder
measure of policy behavior, the standard deviation of short-term 
rates.  Differences in policy rules should affect this statistic. 
For example, if inflation targeters respond more strongly to
inflation movements, then short-term rates should become more
volatile (unless targeting stabilizes inflation, an effect we
fail to find).623
     We examine the volatility of short-term rates at the
quarterly frequency.  Our data are interbank rates from the IFS
(Line 60b).  We examine only the shorter of our pre-targeting
samples, the ones starting in 1985, because consistent data are
not available before then.  For once, we throw out a few
troublesome outliers.  For all countries, we delete the three
quarters of the ERM crisis, 1992:3 through 1993:1, when interest
rates jumped to very high levels.
     The results, in Table IX, follow the pattern we have seen
again and again.  Interest-rate volatility is lower for non-
targeters than for targeters and falls over time for both groups. 
The decrease appears larger for targeters if we ignore regression
to the mean, but not if we control for it.     
VII. BIVARIATE RESULTS
     So far we have examined the univariate behavior of
inflation, output, and interest rates.  In principle, we would
like to look more deeply at whether inflation targeting changes
the structure of the economy.  For our short samples, however, it
is impractical to estimate sophisticated structural equations.
Here we take one step beyond our univariate analysis by examining
several bivariate relations.8 In principle, the optimal estimators of the group means and equation (1) use
weights that depend on both the variances of the coefficient estimates and the
variances of true coefficients across countries in a group.  Using the
residuals from our cross-country regressions, we have estimated the variances
of true coefficients, and find they are small.  We therefore set these
variances to zero and derive the optimal weights based on the variances of
coefficient estimates.  These weights are the ones described in the text.    
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estimated changes in coefficients.  We do not add estimates of
initial coefficients to the right-hand sides of our regressions,
because the measurement error in the coefficients would create
bias.
8  
     B. Results
     Table X presents our bivariate results.  For the final time,
we find that economic behavior has changed over time, but the
changes are similar for inflation targeters and non-targeters.
     There are two significant changes over time: expectations
respond less to inflation movements, and inflation responds less
to commodity prices.  Both results suggest a greater anchoring of
inflation.  Strikingly, the commodity-price coefficients fall by
an order of magnitude.  For example, the average coefficient in
sample 1 (1960 to the start of IT) is 0.05 for non-targeters. 
This means that a ten percent rise in the relative price of
commodities raises inflation by five tenths of a percentage
point.  For the IT period (sample 3), the coefficient is 0.006.
     In contrast, there is no evidence that inflation targeting
affects the coefficients that we consider.  In the twelve27
regressions in Table X, the targeting dummy is never significant
at the ten percent level.
VIII: COMPARISON TO OTHER STUDIES
     The closest study to ours is that of Neumann and von Hagen.
Their paper and ours have the same title.  Part of their paper,
like this one, compares the volatility of inflation, output, and
interest rates across time periods and groups of countries.  But
Neumann and von Hagen’s conclusion differs from ours: “Taken
together, the evidence confirms the claim that IT matters” (p.
144).  
     Our study differs from Neumann and von Hagen in many
details, but the crucial difference may be our treatment of
regression to the mean.  After the sentence quoted above, they
continue: “Adopting this policy has permitted IT countries to
reduce inflation to low levels and curb the volatility of
inflation and interest rates; in so doing, these banks have been
able to approach the stability achieved by the Bundesbank”
(Neumann and von Hagen’s main example of a non-inflation
targeter).  We, too, find that targeters have caught up with non-
targeters along some dimensions, but this convergence was not
caused by targeting.9 See also Johnson (2002) and the literature review in Neumann and von Hagen.
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     A number of other studies report evidence that inflation
targeting matters.  For example, researchers report that
targeting steepens the Phillips curve (Clifton et al., 2001);
that it dampens movements in expected inflation (Sheridan, 2001);
and that it increases the predictability of inflation (Corbo et
al., 2002).9  Some of these results may again reflect regression
to the mean rather than a true effect of targeting.  This
possibility is suggested by Corbo et al.’s conclusion that
“Inflation targeters have consistently reduced inflation forecast
errors (based on country VAR models) toward the low levels
prevalent in non-targeting industrial countries” (p. 263).
     It is difficult to compare our results directly to previous
work, as the methodologies are quite different.  We believe,
however, that our results cast doubt on earlier findings that
inflation targeting affects economic behavior.  It seems unlikely
that targeting would affect the relationships studied by previous
authors and yet, as we find, have no effects on the means or
standard deviations of inflation, output, or interest rates.29
IX. CONCLUSION
     We find no evidence that inflation targeting improves a
country’s economic performance.  How should one interpret this
result?     
     One possibility is that targeting and non-targeting
countries pursue similar interest-rate policies.  Research
suggests that the policies needed to implement inflation
targeting are similar to the Taylor rules that fit the United
States and other non-targeters (e.g. Svensson, 1997; Ball, 1999). 
Indeed, observers have suggested that the U.S. is a “covert
inflation targeter” (Mankiw, 2001).  This view is supported by
our finding of similar interest-rate volatility for targeters and
non-targeters.  If targeting does not change the behavior of
policy instruments, it is not shocking that economic outcomes do
not change either.  This result suggests, however, that the
formal and institutional aspects of targeting – the public
announcements of targets, the inflation reports, the enhanced
independence of central banks – are not important.  Nothing in
the data suggests that covert targeters would benefit from
adopting explicit targets.
     Our results do not provide an argument against inflation
targeting, for we have not found that it does any harm.  In
addition, there may be benefits that we do not measure.  First,30
aspects of inflation targeting may be desirable for political
rather than economic reasons.  Bernanke et al. argue that
targeting produces more open policymaking, making “the role of
the central bank more consistent with the principles of a
democratic society” (p. 333).
     Second, inflation targeting might improve economic
performance in the future.  The economic environment has been
fairly tranquil during the inflation-targeting era, and so many
central banks have not been tested severely.  Perhaps future
policymakers will face 1970s-size supply shocks, or strong
political pressures for inflationary policies.  At that point, we
may see that inflation targeters handle these challenges better
than policymakers who “just do it.” 
     Thus a paper that replicates this study in 25 or 50 years
may find ample evidence that targeting improves performance.  The
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Rationale for choice of starting dates
Australia Q4 1994 Q4 1994 In September 1994, the Governor of the Reserve Bank of 
Australia announced that "underlying inflation of 2 to 3 per 
cent is a reasonable goal for monetary policy."  See Bernanke 
et al. (1999, pp. 218-220) for further discussion.
Canada Q1 1992 Q1 1994 The first target range was announced by the Bank of Canada in 
February 1991: 2 to 4 percent over 1992 (i.e. December 1991 
to December 1992).  In December 1993, a range of 1 to 3 
percent was established for 1994, and the range has remained 
constant since then.
Finland Q1 1994 Q1 1994 In February 1993, the Bank of Finland stated its intention to 
"stabilize the rate of inflation permanently at the level of 2% 
by 1995."  It appears that they were referring to year-over-year 
inflation measured at the start of 1995; thus the period covered 
by the first target begins at the start of 1994.
New Zealand Q3 1990 Q1 1993 A target of 3-5% over 1990 was announced in April 1990.  A 
target of 0-2% for 1993 was announced in February 1991.  The 
target range has remained roughly unchanged since then (but 
see footnote 2 in the text).
Spain Q2  1995 Q1 1994 
a  The first target, announced in December 1994, was for year-
over-year inflation of 3.5-4% "by early 1996."
Sweden Q1 1995 Q1 1995  The Riksbank announced in January 1993 that it aimed "to 
limit the annual increase in the consumer price index from 
1995 onwards to 2 percent."  This target applied to inflation 
over all of 1995, not to year-over-year inflation at the start of 
1995 (Svensson, 1995).
United Kingdom Q1 1993 Q1 1993 In October 1992 the Bank of England announced a 2.5% 
target, beginning immediately.
Non-IT countries Q3 1993 Q1 1994  The starting dates were computed as averages of the starting 
dates for inflation targeting or constant inflation targeting 
countries.
a Spain is an inflation targeter but not a constant inflation targeter.  Q1 1994 is the start date of the constant-targeting period for non-
constant targeters.Table II:  Sample Periods
Country  Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 Sample 5 Sample 6
Australia start of sample 1960:1 1985:1 1994:4 1960:1 1985:1 1994:4
end of sample 1994:2 1994:2 2001:4 1994:2 1994:2 2001:4
Canada 1960:1 1985:1 1992:1 1960:1 1985:1 1994:1
1991:4 1991:4 2001:4 1993:3 1993:3 2001:4
Finland 1960:1 1985:1 1994:1 1960:1 1985:1 1994:1
1993:4 1993:4 1998:4 1993:4 1993:4 1998:4
New Zealand 1960:1 1985:1 1990:3 1960:1 1985:1 1993:1
1990:1 1990:1 2001:4 1992:4 1992:4 2001:4
Spain 1960:1 1985:1 1995:2 1960:1 1985:1 1994:1
1995:1 1995:1 1998:4 1993:3 1993:3 1998:4
Sweden 1960:1 1985:1 1995:1 1960:1 1985:1 1995:1
1994:4 1994:4 2001:4 1994:4 1994:4 2001:4
United Kingdom 1960:1 1985:1 1993:1 1960:1 1985:1 1993:1
1992:3 1992:3 2001:4 1992:3 1992:3 2001:4
1960:1 1985:1 1993:3 1960:1 1985:1 1994:1
1993:2 1993:2 2001:4 1993:3 1993:3 2001:4
1960:1 1985:1 1993:3 1960:1 1985:1 1994:1
1993:2 1993:2 1998:4 1993:3 1993:3 1998:4
Norway 1960:1 1985:1 1993:3 1960:1 1985:1 1994:1
1993:2 1993:2 2000:4 1993:3 1993:3 2000:4
Switzerland 1960:1 1985:1 1993:3 1960:1 1985:1 1994:1
1993:2 1993:2 1999:4 1993:3 1993:3 1999:4
United States, Japan, Denmark
Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, PortugalTable III:  Mean Inflation Rate (Annualised)
Panel A
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 Sample 5 Sample 6
Australia 6.23 5.38 2.62 6.23 5.38 2.62
Canada 5.35 4.37 1.62 5.16 3.83 1.58
New Zealand 8.62 10.23 1.94 8.08 7.48 2.00
Sweden 6.41 5.38 1.01 6.41 5.38 1.01
United Kingdom 7.54 5.50 2.43 7.54 5.50 2.43
Finland 6.90 4.07 1.08 6.90 4.07 1.08
Spain 9.16 5.93 2.49 9.35 6.12 3.06
United States 4.82 3.72 2.47 4.80 3.66 2.47
Japan 5.16 1.63 0.12 5.15 1.68 0.09
Denmark 6.50 3.23 2.21 6.47 3.19 2.23
Austria 4.30 2.72 1.77 4.29 2.72 1.64
Belgium 4.64 2.53 1.65 4.63 2.53 1.55
France 6.11 3.05 1.37 6.08 3.01 1.33
Germany 3.40 2.24 1.65 3.40 2.25 1.59
Ireland 7.85 3.13 2.11 7.82 3.13 2.05
Italy 8.43 5.72 3.29 8.40 5.69 3.18
Netherlands 4.41 1.58 2.19 4.40 1.64 2.12
Portugal 11.99 10.64 3.54 11.96 10.54 2.94
Norway 6.26 4.93 2.20 6.22 4.81 2.28
Switzerland 3.89 3.26 0.84 3.87 3.22 0.79
Averages
IT 7.17 5.84 1.88 ... ... ...
NIT 5.98 3.72 1.95 ... ... ...
CIT ... ... ... 6.72 5.27 1.78
NCIT ... ... ... 6.20 3.87 1.95
Panel B
Dependent Variable: Change in mean inflation between samples
(3) - (1) (3) - (2) (6) - (4) (6) - (5) (3) - (1) (3) - (2) (6) - (4) (6) - (5)
Constant -4.03 -1.77 -4.25 -1.92 0.42 1.12 0.52 1.01
(0.46) (0.52) (0.47) (0.46) (0.49) (0.32) (0.50) (0.33)
-1.26 -2.19 -0.68 -1.57 -0.38 -0.55 -0.29 -0.51
(0.78) (0.88) (0.86) (0.84) (0.33) (0.35) (0.33) (0.34)
Initial value -0.74 -0.78 -0.77 -0.76
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Adjusted R-squared 0.08 0.21 -0.02 0.12 0.85 0.90 0.85 0.87
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Inflation targeting 
dummy
Equation 1 Equation 2Table IV:  Standard Deviation of Inflation Rate
Panel A
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 Sample 5 Sample 6
Australia 4.62 3.51 3.01 4.62 3.51 3.01
Canada 3.34 1.75 1.59 3.35 1.93 1.75
New Zealand 5.83 7.42 1.70 5.88 7.21 1.78
Sweden 3.99 3.62 1.57 3.99 3.62 1.57
United Kingdom 5.70 2.80 1.34 5.70 2.80 1.34
Finland 4.51 1.87 1.16 4.51 1.87 1.16
Spain 5.80 2.00 1.38 5.85 2.07 1.64
United States 3.27 1.64 0.94 3.26 1.65 0.96
Japan 5.00 1.76 1.73 4.98 1.76 1.65
Denmark 4.77 2.14 0.68 4.77 2.12 0.70
Austria 2.70 1.36 1.18 2.69 1.34 1.15
Belgium 3.31 1.54 1.20 3.31 1.51 1.23
France 3.77 1.15 0.81 3.78 1.15 0.84
Germany 2.32 2.85 1.02 2.31 2.81 1.05
Ireland 6.52 1.54 1.04 6.50 1.52 1.06
Italy 6.08 1.55 1.60 6.06 1.54 1.64
Netherlands 3.40 1.71 0.75 3.39 1.72 0.71
Portugal 9.21 3.86 2.50 9.18 3.84 1.52
Norway 3.84 2.52 1.24 3.85 2.57 1.24
Switzerland 2.73 2.61 0.89 2.72 2.57 0.89
Averages
IT 4.83 3.28 1.68 ... ... ...
NIT 4.38 2.02 1.20 ... ... ...
CIT ... ... ... 4.67 3.49 1.77
NCIT ... ... ... 4.48 2.01 1.16
Panel B
Dependent Variable: Change in the standard deviation of inflation between samples
(3) - (1) (3) - (2) (6) - (4) (6) - (5) (3) - (1) (3) - (2) (6) - (4) (6) - (5)
Constant -3.18 -0.82 -3.31 -0.85 0.50 0.92 0.79 1.01
(0.41) (0.34) (0.43) (0.32) (0.32) (0.24) (0.30) (0.22)
0.03 -0.78 0.41 -0.87 0.41 0.31 0.59 0.50
(0.70) (0.58) (0.78) (0.59) (0.23) (0.27) (0.21) (0.26)
Initial value -0.84 -0.86 -0.92 -0.93
(0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.09)
Adjusted R-squared -0.06 0.04 -0.04 0.06 0.89 0.83 0.92 0.92
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Equation 1 Equation 2
Inflation targeting 
dummyTable V:  Standard Deviation of Trend Inflation Rate (9 quarter moving average)
Panel A
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 Sample 5 Sample 6
Australia 3.80 2.76 1.37 3.80 2.76 1.37
Canada 2.89 0.44 0.53 2.88 0.92 0.53
New Zealand 4.43 3.55 0.83 4.48 4.20 0.92
Sweden 2.63 2.04 0.57 2.63 2.04 0.57
United Kingdom 4.59 1.69 0.34 4.59 1.69 0.34
Finland 3.54 1.26 0.28 3.54 1.26 0.28
Spain 4.66 0.79 0.42 4.65 0.67 0.92
United States 2.81 0.81 0.44 2.81 0.82 0.45
Japan 3.71 1.06 0.68 3.70 1.04 0.70
Denmark 2.85 0.95 0.27 2.87 0.99 0.27
Austria 1.78 0.82 0.49 1.78 0.83 0.41
Belgium 2.72 0.78 0.21 2.71 0.77 0.21
France 3.35 0.32 0.37 3.36 0.35 0.39
Germany 1.67 1.33 0.25 1.67 1.42 0.18
Ireland 5.20 0.41 0.31 5.20 0.43 0.25
Italy 5.35 0.54 1.10 5.34 0.56 1.06
Netherlands 2.55 1.30 0.14 2.54 1.31 0.13
Portugal 7.21 1.37 0.72 7.19 1.47 0.50
Norway 2.51 1.92 0.33 2.53 1.96 0.33
Switzerland 1.92 1.68 0.41 1.91 1.65 0.39
Averages
IT 3.79 1.79 0.62 ... ... ...
NIT 3.36 1.02 0.44 ... ... ...
CIT ... ... ... 3.65 2.14 0.67
NCIT ... ... ... 3.45 1.02 0.44
Panel B
Dependent Variable: Change in the standard deviation of trend inflation between samples
(3) - (1) (3) - (2) (6) - (4) (6) - (5) (3) - (1) (3) - (2) (6) - (4) (6) - (5)
Constant -2.92 -0.58 -3.00 -0.58 0.16 0.30 0.14 0.33
(0.37) (0.20) (0.36) (0.20) (0.18) (0.13) (0.19) (0.13)
-0.25 -0.58 0.02 -0.90 0.15 0.08 0.21 0.10
(0.62) (0.33) (0.65) (0.36) (0.14) (0.16) (0.15) (0.19)
Initial value -0.92 -0.87 -0.91 -0.89
(0.05) (0.09) (0.05) (0.10)
Adjusted R-squared -0.05 0.10 -0.06 0.22 0.95 0.84 0.95 0.85
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Equation 1 Equation 2
Inflation targeting 
dummyTable VI:  Mean Annual Growth Rates 
Panel A
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 Sample 5 Sample 6
Australia 3.65 3.09 4.59 3.65 3.09 4.59
Canada 4.04 2.52 3.06 3.94 2.30 3.44
New Zealand 3.05 2.72 2.79 2.76 1.68 3.42
Sweden 2.51 1.18 2.82 2.51 1.18 2.82
United Kingdom 2.40 2.69 2.94 2.40 2.69 2.94
Finland 3.15 1.00 4.68 3.15 1.00 4.68
Spain 4.22 2.91 3.25 4.45 3.51 2.94
United States 3.40 2.84 3.39 3.40 2.84 3.39
Japan 5.67 4.12 1.17 5.67 4.12 1.17
Denmark 2.10 1.46 2.81 2.10 1.46 2.81
Austria 3.38 2.87 2.13 3.38 2.87 2.13
Belgium 3.32 2.56 2.54 3.32 2.56 2.54
France 3.64 2.55 2.02 3.64 2.55 2.02
Germany 3.44 4.31 1.62 3.44 4.31 1.62
Ireland 4.17 4.36 8.50 4.17 4.36 8.50
Italy 3.91 2.43 2.01 3.91 2.43 2.01
Netherlands 3.99 2.90 3.19 3.99 2.90 3.19
Portugal 4.10 4.41 3.08 4.10 4.41 3.08
Norway 3.48 2.50 3.50 3.48 2.50 3.50
Switzerland 2.55 2.01 1.18 2.55 2.01 1.18
Averages
IT 3.29 2.30 3.45 ... ... ...
NIT 3.63 3.02 2.86 ... ... ...
CIT ... ... ... 3.07 1.99 3.65
NCIT ... ... ... 3.69 3.06 2.86
Panel B
Dependent Variable: Change in mean annual growth rate between samples
(3) - (1) (3) - (2) (6) - (4) (6) - (5) (3) - (1) (3) - (2) (6) - (4) (6) - (5)
Constant -0.77 -0.17 -0.82 -0.19 2.04 1.64 1.78 1.40
(0.47) (0.46) (0.44) (0.43) (1.79) (1.31) (1.83) (1.31)
0.93 1.31 1.40 1.85 0.67 0.88 0.97 1.30
(0.80) (0.77) (0.81) (0.78) (0.78) (0.81) (0.84) (0.88)
Initial value -0.77 -0.60 -0.71 -0.52
(0.48) (0.41) (0.48) (0.41)
Adjusted R-squared 0.02 0.09 0.10 0.20 0.10 0.15 0.15 0.23
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Equation 1 Equation 2
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Panel A
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 Sample 5 Sample 6
Australia 2.24 1.91 1.73 2.24 1.91 1.73
Canada 2.50 2.60 1.46 2.53 2.48 1.32
New Zealand 2.82 3.50 2.28 2.85 3.06 1.93
Sweden 2.27 2.10 1.36 2.27 2.10 1.36
United Kingdom 2.17 2.33 0.77 2.17 2.33 0.77
Finland 3.23 3.95 1.09 3.23 3.95 1.09
Spain 3.13 2.08 0.73 3.05 1.66 0.68
United States 2.38 1.51 1.38 2.38 1.51 1.38
Japan 4.00 1.74 1.28 4.00 1.74 1.28
Denmark 2.31 1.50 1.26 2.31 1.50 1.26
Austria 2.23 1.17 0.74 2.23 1.17 0.74
Belgium 2.11 1.13 0.93 2.11 1.13 0.93
France 1.98 1.28 0.88 1.98 1.28 0.88
Germany 2.79 3.84 0.58 2.79 3.84 0.58
Ireland 2.08 1.86 1.92 2.08 1.86 1.92
Italy 2.91 1.01 0.66 2.91 1.01 0.66
Netherlands 5.53 1.09 0.54 5.53 1.09 0.54
Portugal 3.59 1.98 0.47 3.59 1.98 0.47
Norway 1.85 1.66 1.70 1.85 1.66 1.70
Switzerland 2.77 1.92 0.84 2.77 1.92 0.84
Averages
IT 2.54 2.73 1.45 ... ... ...
NIT 2.81 1.67 1.01 ... ... ...
CIT ... ... ... 2.55 2.64 1.37
NCIT ... ... ... 2.83 1.67 0.99
Panel B
Dependent Variable: Change in the standard deviation of growth rate between samples
(3) - (1) (3) - (2) (6) - (4) (6) - (5) (3) - (1) (3) - (2) (6) - (4) (6) - (5)
Constant -1.80 -0.65 -1.84 -0.68 1.59 0.95 1.53 1.08
(0.32) (0.24) (0.30) (0.23) (0.38) (0.30) (0.34) (0.28)
0.52 -0.64 0.66 -0.60 0.29 0.30 0.32 0.43
(0.54) (0.41) (0.55) (0.43) (0.22) (0.28) (0.21) (0.26)
Initial value -1.20 -0.96 -1.19 -1.06
(0.13) (0.16) (0.11) (0.15)
Adjusted R-squared 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.83 0.69 0.86 0.75
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Equation 1 Equation 2
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Panel A
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 Sample 5 Sample 6
Australia 10.78 11.83 6.82 10.78 11.83 6.82
Canada 8.72 10.19 7.04 8.72 10.02 6.72
New Zealand 10.70 15.15 7.44 10.65 13.34 7.04
Sweden 9.22 10.99 6.48 9.22 10.99 6.48
United Kingdom 9.86 10.35 6.62 9.86 10.35 6.62
Finland 9.46 10.65 7.13 9.46 10.65 7.13
Spain 11.78 12.24 6.66 11.90 12.77 8.25
United States 7.61 8.43 6.05 7.61 8.43 6.05
Japan 7.01 5.65 2.45 7.01 5.65 2.45
Denmark 12.06 10.17 6.28 12.06 10.17 6.28
Austria 8.12 7.66 6.18 8.12 7.66 6.18
Belgium 8.51 9.05 6.33 8.51 9.05 6.33
France 9.44 9.68 6.26 9.44 9.68 6.26
Germany 7.60 7.32 6.03 7.60 7.32 6.03
Ireland 10.34 10.34 6.90 10.34 10.34 6.90
Italy 10.42 12.45 8.77 10.42 12.45 8.77
Netherlands 7.43 7.43 6.02 7.43 7.43 6.02
Portugal 15.69 21.23 8.35 15.69 21.23 8.35
Norway 8.56 11.65 6.38 8.56 11.65 6.38
Switzerland 4.67 5.16 3.82 4.67 5.16 3.82
Averages
IT 10.07 11.63 6.88 ... ... ...
NIT 9.04 9.71 6.14 ... ... ...
CIT ... ... ... 9.78 11.19 6.80
NCIT ... ... ... 9.24 9.93 6.29
Panel B
Dependent Variable: Change in mean long-term interest rate between samples
(3) - (1) (3) - (2) (6) - (4) (6) - (5) (3) - (1) (3) - (2) (6) - (4) (6) - (5)
Constant -2.89 -3.57 -2.95 -3.64 2.57 3.38 2.23 3.23
(0.47) (0.73) (0.44) (0.69) (0.98) (0.67) (0.96) (0.70)
-0.30 -1.18 -0.03 -0.76 0.33 0.20 0.27 0.12
(0.80) (1.24) (0.80) (1.25) (0.49) (0.45) (0.49) (0.47)
Initial value -0.60 -0.72 -0.56 -0.69
(0.10) (0.06) (0.10) (0.07)
Adjusted R-squared -0.05 -0.01 -0.06 -0.03 0.63 0.88 0.61 0.86
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Equation 1 Equation 2
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Panel A
Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 5 Sample 6
Australia 4.15 1.07 4.15 1.07
Canada 1.87 1.21 2.35 1.20
New Zealand 5.24 2.35 5.85 1.79
Sweden 2.21 1.86 2.21 1.86
United Kingdom 2.10 0.85 2.10 0.85
Finland 2.26 1.10 2.26 1.10
Spain 2.59 1.97 1.99 1.82
United States 1.63 1.04 1.75 0.93
Japan 1.62 0.89 1.64 0.75
Denmark 1.01 1.70 1.03 1.14
Austria 1.94 1.11 1.91 0.78
Belgium 1.62 1.62 1.61 1.05
France 1.05 1.60 1.04 1.38
Germany 2.08 1.20 2.06 0.91
Ireland 2.00 0.77 2.08 0.76
Italy 1.51 1.93 1.59 2.00
Netherlands 1.68 1.17 1.66 0.92
Portugal 2.77 2.54 2.79 2.38
Norway 1.73 1.27 1.97 1.30
Switzerland 2.55 1.27 2.51 1.10
Averages
IT 2.92 1.49 ... ...
NIT 1.79 1.39 ... ...
CIT ... ... 3.15 1.31
NCIT ... ... 1.83 1.23
Panel B
Dependent Variable: Change in the standard deviation of the short term interest rate
(3) - (2) (6) - (5) (3) - (2) (6) - (5)
Constant -0.39 -0.60 1.04 0.96
(0.23) (0.24) (0.28) (0.26)
-1.04 -1.24 -0.13 -0.11
(0.39) (0.44) (0.28) (0.28)
Initial value -0.80 -0.85
(0.14) (0.12)
Adjusted R-squared 0.28 0.31 0.76 0.82
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Equation 1 Equation 2
Inflation targeting 
dummyTable X:  Multivariate Results
Panel A:  Phillips-Curve Coefficients
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 Sample 5 Sample 6
Weighted Averages
IT 0.35 0.10 0.18 ... ... ...
NIT 0.27 0.25 0.17 ... ... ...
CIT ... ... ... 0.37 0.18 0.14
NCIT ... ... ... 0.27 0.25 0.18
Dependent Variable: Change in estimated coefficient between samples
(3) - (1) (3) - (2) (6) - (4) (6) - (5)
Constant -0.12 -0.07 -0.11 -0.05
(0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07)
0.13 0.20 0.00 0.07
(0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.11)
Panel B:  Effect of Commodity-Price Changes on Inflation
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 Sample 5 Sample 6
Weighted Averages
IT 0.044 0.036 0.005 ... ... ...
NIT 0.054 0.068 0.006 ... ... ...
CIT ... ... ... 0.049 0.082 0.014
NCIT ... ... ... 0.053 0.065 0.006
Dependent Variable: Change in estimated coefficient between samples
(3) - (1) (3) - (2) (6) - (4) (6) - (5)
Constant -0.048 -0.050 -0.047 -0.048
(0.010) (0.014) (0.009) (0.013)
0.006 -0.012 0.012 -0.027
(0.024) (0.031) (0.024) (0.034)
continued
Equation 1 (Weighted Least Squares)





Panel C:  Response of Expected Inflation to Inflation 
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 Sample 5 Sample 6
Weighted Averages
IT 0.83 0.71 0.43 ... ... ...
NIT 0.83 0.71 0.66 ... ... ...
CIT ... ... ... 0.82 0.63 0.45
NCIT ... ... ... 0.83 0.71 0.63
Dependent Variable: Change in estimated coefficient between samples
(3) - (1) (3) - (2) (6) - (4) (6) - (5)
Constant -0.23 -0.10 -0.25 -0.12
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06)
-0.15 -0.13 -0.10 -0.05
(0.10) (0.14) (0.11) (0.15)
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Equation 1 (Weighted Least Squares)
Inflation targeting 
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